

## Relevant Background

The STOP THE TRAFFIK Group has a strong history of delivering activity with vulnerable communities that reduces their risk of being trafficked into exploitation. In the current crisis, we are working with a range of ground partners to produce this analysis.

We know from observing timelines with large unpredictable groups of people on the move (Rohingya and Syria) that initially they are subject to high levels of short-term assistance. Trafficker groups begin to create structures to encourage higher-value individuals to go on a journey by promising them hope of a good opportunity that is, in reality, a life of exploitation. It is likely that this is already beginning to be established and it is likely it will gain traction as refugees become more desperate for income.

## Vulnerability to Trafficking & Exploitation

### Introduction

The war continues and appears set to grind on for the longer term. The Government of Ukraine has just mandated the evacuation of the east of the country and it is likely that this will lead to a second surge of displaced persons from the country. Whilst a significant proportion of those who left Ukraine have returned it seems that with the arrival of colder weather, the lack of gas and other power sources in Ukraine will likely push more of the population to consider moving West and South.

### Previous Key Judgements

Please see previous editions here: [Key Judgements 1](#), [Key Judgements 2](#), [Key Judgements 3](#), [Key Judgements 4](#) and [Key Judgements 5](#).

## Key Judgements

**1)** It is clear that those displaced by the war, within Ukraine or to third countries, will become more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation over time as traffickers establish markets and build recruiting networks.

**2)** There appear to be many thousands of people who are 'missing' or unaccounted for in the process of moving. It remains to be established if a proportion of these people are in exploitation as a result of trafficking. Some are likely considering the level of 'chancer' activity that was apparent at border crossings. There is very little evidence of trafficking cases as yet.

**3)** English language learning ads online / social media are being used as a front for recruitment for sexual exploitation.

**4)** There are signs of 'host and guest fatigue' in receiving nations as the practicalities of living together collide. The Homes for Ukraine program in the U.K. has been operating for 4 months and will need to be extended from the 6 months agreed, but currently is rarely discussed. A small proportion of hosts are motivated by the opportunity to have sexual relations with their Ukraine guests. Ukrainians in the U.K. who abandon their hosts may become more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation and the number of Ukrainians registered as homeless in the U.K. is growing quickly. Previous research has identified that homelessness in the U.K. carries an increased risk of exploitation

**5)** Ukrainians who are already in the U.K. are not well connected to information about rights (including the right to work and minimum wage), benefits and support and as a result, are economically vulnerable.

**6)** It is likely that brokers will become more active with fake or exploitative jobs in the next weeks as financial pressures grow.

**7)** In Scotland it seems that the Hotel accommodation scheme for Ukrainians displaced by the war is for some too temporary. It may present an opportunity for those with intent to traffick and exploit.

## Information Requirements (what we need to know)

There is a lot of speculation but very little by way of evidence of trafficking and exploitation. If you are aware of cases, please let us know.

**1)** Evidence of attempts to or the trafficking and exploitation of refugees from Ukraine (place and nature of recruitment – place and nature of exploitation – any details of recruiters and exploiters for either aspect – any financial transactions or debt accrued – any details of coercion / control)

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